Expectations of a business rescue plan: international directives for Chapter 6 implementation by Pretorius, M & Rosslyn-Smith, W
108 
iSouthern African Business Review Volume 18 Number 2 2014
Expectations of a business rescue plan: international 
directives for Chapter 6 implementation
M. Pretorius & W. Rosslyn-Smith
5A B S T R A C T
9Preliminary analysis of business rescue plans suggested that a signifi cant 
contrast exists between international reorganisational plans and those 
being published under the newly formed business rescue regime in 
South Africa. Since the South African regime has emerged from an 
international insolvency framework, an international benchmark was 
used to effectively assist in creating an evaluation tool. To better 
understand the expectations demanded of the plan, principles from 
comparable international regimes were identifi ed. Data on regimes 
were obtained, scrutinised and reported on; the expectations were 
extrapolated and aligned with Chapter 6 of the South African Companies 
Act, No. 71 of 2008, to determine whether the Act complied with 
a set of expectations based on an international perspective. The 
proposed framework shows the key principles that govern rescue plans 
worldwide. The framework could serve as a guideline for the evaluation 
of rescue plans and help practitioners to enhance what is seen as their 
key task, namely to compile the rescue plan. Comparison with the fi ve 
key principles found by the research reveals particular shortcomings in 
Chapter 6 of the South African Companies Act of 2008. International 
regimes indicate that the rescue plan should adhere to a broader and 
more extensive set of expectations than those explicitly provided for 
by the Act.
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Introduction
In preparing for battle, I have always found that plans are useless, but planning is indispens-
able.”  Dwight D. Eisenhower
1In recent years, insolvency systems around the world have begun to adopt formal 
mechanisms to aid financially distressed companies that are engaged in reorganisation. 
Such systems acknowledge that, as a general rule, a business offers greater value as 
a going concern than when in liquidation. South Africa has until recently lacked a 
formal, modern rehabilitation framework. The introduction of the Companies Act, 
No. 71 of 2008, presented ailing companies with a possible alternative to liquidation 
in the form of business rescue. Chapter 6 of the Companies Act encompasses the 
objectives and procedures to be followed before, during and after a company has 
filed for business rescue. The primary purpose is the restructuring of the affairs of 
the company in order to either ensure that the company continues in existence on a 
solvent basis, or provide a better return for the creditors and shareholders than would 
ordinarily result from liquidation (Winer, Levenstein & Barnett 2008).
Business rescue has emerged, however, from far more established rehabilitation 
regimes. The essence of corporate rescue processes was initiated by the United States 
(US) adoption of Chapter 11 in 1978 (Jacoby 2006). The literature on business rescue 
has consequently emerged from a primarily ‘developed world’ model, with very little 
research focused on why and how it takes place in an emerging market. South Africa, 
China and Argentina are among a handful of developing economies to adopt a system 
ostensibly inspired by the US example (Moore & Lubben 2008: 4). Though distinct 
in many ways, it still qualifies as a ‘modern’ rescue regime, sharing similarities with 
countries such as Germany, Australia, the United Kingdom (UK) and Canada (Rajak 
& Henning 1999: 286; Loubser 2010: 207; Anderson 2008; Holtzhauzen 2010: 113).
A prominent component of these rescue proceedings is the business rescue plan, 
also known as a reorganisation plan or proposal. Pretorius (2013) reports preparing 
the plan as a key task of the rescue practitioner. Insolvency laws generally cover a 
number of issues relating to the plan. These include the nature or form of the plan; 
when it is to be prepared; who is allowed to prepare the plan; its content; how it is to 
be approved by creditors; whether court approval is required; the effect of the plan; 
and, finally, how it is to be implemented. These strict guidelines usually take the 
form of expectations in order to accommodate the wide variety of circumstances and 
conditions the plan would be expected to cater for. The majority of these expectations 
would certainly be aligned directly with the objectives of the relevant regime, ensuring 
the system achieved its intended purpose in the best possible manner.
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This paper reviews the theoretical base of international reorganisation plans, 
for local application. Firstly, we aimed to ascertain the expectations of the plan 
held by the various regimes in the light of their prevailing influencers within the 
regime contexts. Secondly, we determined from these expectations the principles 
that represent the core purposes of the reorganisation plan. Lastly, we aligned the 
form and nature of Chapter 6 of the South African Companies Act, No. 71 of 2008, 
with these principles in order to suggest a framework based on the international 
expectations of the business rescue plan.
Key focus of the study
1To develop the industry and increase the success of business rescue, both practitioners 
and academics need to grasp what constitutes an effective and adequate business 
rescue plan. The Companies Intellectual Property Commission (CIPC) also has a 
vested interest. As it has been tasked as the regulator, research in this field will help 
the CIPC to evaluate plans more effectively. The rescue plans offer major insight into 
the practitioner’s abilities (Lotheringen 2013, pers. com.). The focus of this study is 
to establish the expectations of the plan set by international counterparts in corporate 
rescue regimes. This study is intended to establish a set of principles that can be 
used to develop local expectations of business rescue plans. The aim is to ultimately 
construct a foundation for an effective and objective tool to interpret the contents of 
business rescue plans in South Africa.
Literature review
The international regimes of turnaround and business rescue
1The recent introduction of business rescue has brought South Africa in line with 
international insolvency practices by establishing statutory corporate rescue procedures 
with the intention of protecting financially distressed businesses (Vriesendorp & 
Gramatikov 2010). While the term ‘business rescue’ has been coined as a native 
phase for the concept, it shares many similarities with modern reorganisation 
regimes (Rajak & Henning 1999: 286). More importantly, it emulates a global trend 
in insolvency legislation. The concept is governed, inter alia, by Chapter 6: ‘Business 
rescue and compromise with creditors’ within the Companies Act (hereafter referred 
to as Chapter 6).
Most modern insolvency systems offer financially distressed debtors two 
distinct formal avenues to resolve such difficulties. The first, and notably the most 
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traditional, is liquidation, whereby the debtor’s assets are seized and sold and the 
proceeds distributed to creditors in relation to their debt exposure. The alternative 
is commonly known as rehabilitation, colloquially referred to as business rescue. 
This route has in recent years become more common among developed nations, a 
trend that ironically emerged from South Africa in 1926 under the term ‘judicial 
management’ (Westbrook 2010: 122). Modern rehabilitation has, however, evolved 
substantially since then and become a commercial tool devoted to maintaining a 
business as a going concern.
The modernisation of South Africa’s insolvency law has enabled features 
generally consistent with international best practices to be incorporated (Johnson 
& Meyerman 2010: 20). Thus it is regarded as a modern rescue regime, in line with 
other contemporary, effective, efficient and well-regulated commercial law systems. 
Smits (1999: 86) defines the trend as follows:
Modern corporate rescue and reorganisation seeks to take advantage of the reality that in many 
cases an enterprise not only has substantial value as a going concern, but its going concern 
value exceeds its liquidation value. Through judicial bankruptcy procedures, reorganisation 
seeks to maximise, preserve and possibly even enhance the value of a debtor’s business enter-
prise, in order to maximise payment to the creditors of the distressed debtor.
1In line with international practice is the preparation and implementation of a rescue 
plan (Burdette 2004: 259; United Nations 2005: 209). Though varying guidelines 
and regulations exist, the plan remains a critical component of most modern rescue 
systems. The literature provides an overview of the business rescue plan from an 
international perspective. In the context of South Africa’s Chapter 6, it offers an 
insight into the expectations set by the most relevant regimes. The US, UK, Australia 
and Canada are all regarded as modern systems representing the latest international 
developments (Burdette 2004: 438). Current legislation is predominantly modelled 
on the best practices in these countries (Du Preez 2012: 10), which therefore serve as 
compatible international benchmarks in this study.
While reviewing the plan in a specific regime, ‘agency theory’ (also referred to as 
the principal–agent theory) should always be considered in line with the principles 
of the insolvency law (Lan & Heracleous 2010: 301; Pretorius & Holtzhauzen 2008: 
92). Such factors would no doubt influence the plan. Where the primacy of creditors’ 
interests predominates over equity interest, the court and other affected parties may 
have influence over proceedings as well. Figure 1 distinguishes between natural 
and artificial influencers over the plan. Natural influencers exist within formal and 
informal turnarounds and are not duly enforced by law. Artificial influencers are 
unique to formal turnaround proceedings. They vary between legal frameworks, 
but are intended to influence the shape of the plan. The concern about artificial 
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influencers is that they vary in accordance with the expectations set by a regime. 
The disclosure of information needed for informed assessment rests on a plan that 
is objective, transparent and ultimately effective. Identifying generic expectations 
should thus be done in the light of such circumstances, so as to avoid any undue 
influence as far as possible.
1
Figure 1: Infl uencers over the business rescue plan
1Legislation generally prescribes when a plan is to be prepared; who is allowed to 
prepare the plan; the content; means of approval; whether court confirmation is 
necessary; the effect of the plan; and how it is to be implemented. Some laws go so far 
as to dictate the standardised information to be presented. All of this aims to guide 
proceedings to meet the expectations with which the law aligns itself.
The paper proceeds by describing the core elements of each regime as it impacts 
on the reorganisation plan. The Acts referred to are the relevant Acts governing the 
specific regime being discussed.
South Africa: Chapter 6 Business Rescue
1Business rescue, as defined by the Act, refers to the proceedings to facilitate the 
rehabilitation of a company that is financially distressed by providing for the 
temporary supervision of the company and the management of its affairs, business 
and property, as well as a temporary moratorium on the rights of claimants against 
the company or in respect of property in its possession (Republic of South Africa 
2008).
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Business rescue is designed to resolve a company’s future direction quickly. 
An independent and suitably qualified person, referred to as a business rescue 
practitioner, takes full control of the company to try to work out a way to save the 
business. Where a turnaround is unlikely to succeed, the aim is to administer the 
affairs of the company in a way that results in a better return for creditors than they 
would have received if the company had been liquidated. The process culminates in 
the development and, if accepted, the implementation of a plan to rescue the company 
by restructuring its affairs, business, property, debt and other liabilities, and equity.
Affected parties (i.e. creditors, shareholders, employees or trade union) are 
recognised through their participation in the development and approval of the plan. 
They are in addition entitled to bring about an application for court intervention 
throughout the process. Since the Act has only recently been introduced, limited 
literature on the topic exists to date. Currently the industry is bound solely by section 
150, with few court judgements to interpret it so far.
United States of America
1Credited with initiating the reform of bankruptcy and insolvency statutes with the 
birth of the modern-day rescue culture, the US has had a profound impact on the 
industry (Moore & Lubben 2008: 3; Du Preez 2012: 10). As prescribed in Chapter 11 
of the Bankruptcy Code 1978, filing for the reorganisation of a company brings about 
a moratorium on enforcement proceedings against the debtor company or its property 
while a plan of reorganisation (US Plan) is worked out with its creditors (Franks, 
Nyborg & Torous 1996: 89; McCormack 2008: 517). The provisions of the code allow 
a firm to remain in operation while management reassesses its business plan and 
negotiates the restructuring of its capital structure, binding all existing creditors and 
shareholders to the plan’s acceptance (Bracewell & Giuliani 2012: 2). The objective of 
Chapter 11 is defined by the US Supreme Court as follows (McCormack 2008: 521):
In proceedings under the reorganisation provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, a troubled en-
terprise may be restructured to enable it to operate successfully in the future. ... By permitting 
reorganisation, Congress anticipated that the business would continue to provide jobs, to satisfy 
creditors’ claims, and to produce a return for its owners ... Congress presumed that the assets of 
the debtor would be more valuable if used in a rehabilitated business than if ‘sold for scrap’.
1The first 120 days offer the debtor in possession (DIP) an ‘exclusivity period’ to 
propose a reorganisation plan, but thereafter any creditor may do so. Of note is that 
the party which has the ability to file a plan can greatly influence the direction of the 
Chapter 11 case (Bracewell & Giuliani 2012: 18). Notably unlike the case in business 
rescue, management remains in control of the company in the majority of filings. 
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The result is that the debtor has significant influence over the plan, something that 
is not unnatural in an informal rescue situation.
The expectations of the Chapter 11 reorganisation plan are set by the parties 
responsible for its approval, being the creditors and the court. The creditors’ vote 
is required for any plan to progress; however, in the event of a ‘cramdown’, they are 
less of an authority than one might at first think (Kunkel, Peterson & Mitchell 2009: 
3). The ultimate confirmation rests with the bankruptcy court. The court must in 
all fairness approve a plan that is feasible, is in the best interest of creditors, fair and 
equitable and completed in good faith.
The expectations of shareholders are somewhat less pertinent, as they have no 
real bargaining power other than the ability to delay the proceedings (Hubbard & 
Stephenson 1997: 550; Loubser 2010: 116). However, the reorganisation plan overall 
favours a debtor-friendly ideology, and as management typically plays a major role in 
its preparation, it tends to be ‘closer to home’, leading to overly optimistic projections 
(Hubbard & Stephenson 1997: 551). In reality, deviations from the ‘absolute priority’ 
rule are common, with shareholders often getting something out at the cost of 
unsecured creditors. The inclusion of ‘death trap’ provisions in reorganisation plans, 
where an impaired class, in particular an equity class, receives a distribution under 
the plan in return for an affirmative vote (Bloch 2009: 1), is evidence that additional 
artificial influence is needed to prevent unfair discrimination.
In accordance with paragraph (11)11 USC § 1129, the court can only approve 
a plan that is feasible (Bracewell & Giuliani 2012: 27). The feasibility of the plan 
depends on its turnaround strategy. The goal of the debtor’s plan focuses on restoring 
the company to financial health, not simply through debt restructuring, but in 
addition through managerial decisions aimed at producing a more efficient business 
entity (Elson, Helms & Moncus 2002: 1925). It must therefore detail the strategic 
mechanisms that are forecasted to return the company to financial health. Such a plan 
would be obligated to explain how it aims to cover its expenses, including creditors’ 
claims (Bracewell & Giuliani 2012: 23; Balovich 2002). The US plan is therefore 
expected to serve as a feasibility declaration detailing the turnaround strategy so that 
it can be evaluated to determine its overall likelihood of success.
The plan should clearly communicate its intention and impact on the rights of 
creditors. The role of creditors in the US regime is heavily affected by the debtor-
friendly principles the process abides by. They are by all accounts, however, nothing 
less than one of the primary concerns of the plan. Underlying the reorganisation is 
the notion that creditors will gain more from the continued existence of the company 
than from its liquidation (Bracewell & Giuliani 2012: 24). The onus is on the plan to 
prove that this is indeed the case. The ‘fair and equitable’ requirement of the plan, an 
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extension of the ‘absolute priority’ rule, mandates the plan to pay a creditor class in 
full before any class junior to it receives a distribution (Hubbard & Stephenson 1997: 
550). If a creditor objects to the plan, it must forgo a ‘best interests of creditors’ test 
in court. In the event that a class of creditors rejects the plan, a ‘fair and equitable’ 
test is necessary, and a ‘cramdown’, where the court approves a plan despite creditor 
objections, is possible (Kunkel et al. 2009: 3). To ensure the court is well equipped to 
subdue the rights of a creditor, Chapter 11 (11 USC § 1125) requires that a disclosure 
statement be presented. There is assurance that in any event creditors should not 
suffer at the expense of equity and that their return should always exceed that of 
liquidation. Creditors can also challenge the debtor’s valuation of its collateral and 
the feasibility of the plan (Kunkel et al. 2009: 3). The end result is that the US plan 
is mandated to clearly communicate issues of concern to creditors.
An approved reorganisation plan is binding on all creditors and cannot be modified 
after ‘substantial consummation’ of it has taken place (Carlson 2010: 2). According to 
11 USC § 1141, the effect of confirmation results in the plan’s forming a contractual 
document binding on the debtor and all the creditors. The plan releases the debtor 
from any debt that arose before the commencement of proceedings for relief, unless 
otherwise stated. The contractual ramifications of this are further reason for a clear 
and transparent plan. It is the responsibility of all parties to ensure that the plan is 
capable of achieving its objectives, a task that inevitably relies on the content within 
the plan. The expectation therefore of all the parties affected is that the plan contains 
the contingencies that would accommodate possible deviations and bring focus to 
areas of high risk.
Chapter 11 goes to great lengths to ensure the plan is published in good faith. 
Most notable is the preparation of a disclosure statement that informs interested 
parties about the plan. The US code under 11 USC § 1125 relates to the post-petition 
disclosure and solicitation of the plan. A disclosure hearing is held to ensure that the 
disclosure statement contains accurate information, and that all classes have been 
adequately informed about the plan before voting (Bloch 2009: 4). The code defines 
‘adequate information’ in section 1125(a)(1) as:
information of a kind, and in sufficient detail, as far as is reasonably practicable in light of the 
nature and history of the debtor and the condition of the debtor’s books and records, that would 
enable a hypothetical reasonable investor typical of holders of claims or interests of the relevant 
class to make an informed judgment about the plan.
1In addition to the disclosure statement, Chapter 11 requires the plan to pass a ‘best 
interests of creditors’ test for an objecting creditor or shareholder, as previously 
mentioned. All tests are designed to ensure that the plan is objective and realistic. The 
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US plan is therefore encouraged to be transparent and objective as far as possible, in 
order to facilitate effective decision making by creditors and the court.
Section 364 of the Bankruptcy Code (11 USC § 364 – Obtaining credit) gives 
the DIP a few options to restructure the business. ‘DIP financing’ is one of the 
most prominent forms of post-commencement financing (PCF) available. Section 
364(d) offers super-priority status to investments, to counteract the high levels of 
risk associated with distressed financing. However, the impact of such investment 
decisions has major consequences for all the parties involved. The US plan would 
require a breakdown of such investment decisions, detailing the benefits and risks 
they pose to the affected parties. Fortunately this is not left to the discretion of the 
author, as the disclosure statement is expected to contain adequate information to 
enable a hypothetical investor to make an informed judgement (Bracewell & Giuliani 
2012: 20).
United Kingdom
1The United Kingdom offers distressed companies a number of procedures, namely 
administration, administration receivership, company voluntary arrangement and 
scheme of arrangement. The UK Insolvency Act (1986) contains the majority of 
information pertaining to bankruptcy, except for administration, which is governed 
in legislation by Part 10 of the Enterprise Act (EA) (2002). This represents the 
UK’s formal procedures for dealing with financially troubled companies, and 
is possibly the best contender to equate to the US’s Chapter 11 (Finch 2012: 304). 
However, unlike the case under Chapter 11, yet like that under Chapter 6 in South 
Africa, a ‘practitioner in possession’ regime is used through the appointment of an 
administrator (practitioner). The UK Insolvency Act thereafter sets out a particular 
ranking of objectives to be achieved by the administrator (Wilson & Deniz 2008: 1):
• Rescuing the company as a going concern;
•  Achieving a better result for the company’s creditors as a whole than would be likely if the 
company were wound up (without first being in administration); or
•  Realising property of the company in order to make a distribution to one or more secured or 
preferential creditors.
1The revised version of the Act aspires to propagate a ‘rescue culture’, inspired by 
the priorities set in Cork’s Report of 1982, which also included transparency, 
accountability, inclusivity and additional legal formalities (Fitch 2003: 122; Fletcher 
2004: 122). A statutory moratorium is offered to administrators, under which an 
investigation of the company’s affairs is conducted and a proposal of administration 
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(UK Plan) formulated by the administrator for the purposes set out in the order. The 
proposal must be published as soon as possible, but in any event within eight weeks 
of the administrator’s appointment. Rule 2.33 of the UK Insolvency Act (Parliament 
of the United Kingdom 1986) prescribes the mandatory content to be present in 
the proposal (Lord Chancellor 1986: 70). Once complete, it is then subjected to 
creditors’ review, whereby it can be approved, rejected or amendments proposed to 
it. Administration is, however, not a complete process in itself, but instead a means 
of reaching a ‘scheme of arrangement’, or company voluntary arrangement (CVA).
A CVA under the Insolvency Act offers the administrator an out-of-court route 
to compile a plan, thus reducing costs and time. The alternative is a scheme of 
arrangement, which is more complex and may take more time to implement, but it 
binds all creditors without exception, making it more powerful than a CVA (Daley 
& Shuster 2013). A scheme of arrangement must be approved by a court and is used 
for large companies with a substantial number of classes of creditors or shareholders. 
Legislation on effecting a scheme of arrangement can be found in the Companies 
Act (2006), Part 26 (ss.895–901) and Part 27 (‘Special Rules for Public Companies’).
The administration process is directly influenced by the administrator, who 
can be appointed in three ways: by the court, by the holder of a qualifying floating 
charge, or by the company and any of its directors. However, the process is severely 
creditor-friendly, allowing secure creditors the ability to influence the selection of an 
administrator (Wilson & Deniz 2008: 2). This makes them generally powerful, highly 
informed players who are well placed to control and contribute to the administration 
procedure (Finch 2012: 305). In addition, the lack of a ‘debtor in possession’ regime 
means directors cannot make rescue decisions while in administration, but are 
consequently required to consult the administrator (Finch 2012: 306). Once in 
administration, the company’s business is conducted almost entirely outside court 
supervision. This offers a less costly and time-consuming avenue, but does result in 
creditors having far greater influence over the proposal than would otherwise be the 
case.
The expectations derived from the UK Insolvency Act are far more defined than 
those of the US Chapter 11. The administrator’s proposal should take into account 
the objectives of the administrator, as stated above, and in so doing align itself with 
the procedural values of transparency, inclusivity and legal formality (Finch 2012: 
304).
The first part of the proposal outlines the details of events leading to the 
appointment of the administrator and the costs that have been incurred to date (Sch. 
B1, para 49 Insolvency Act 1986; Walton 2009: 103). Accompanying these is basic 
information describing the company, its administrator, directors and a breakdown of 
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its financial position (Walton 2009: 103). The desired result is to provide a context for 
the plan and communicate legal formalities to the relevant parties. Full disclosure by 
the administrator must be made to creditors to appear to satisfy the equitable conflict 
rules.
Central to the plan is that the administrator must describe the route to recovery, 
accompanied with a timeframe. If the administrator is of the opinion that the purposes 
of administration cannot be achieved, the reasoning for this must be explained 
(Loubser 2010: 208). Rule 2.33(2)(m) provides that the proposal should contain 
details of how it is envisaged that the purpose of administration will be achieved. 
The proposal in this regard must reveal the mechanisms to be used to restore the 
business to financial health. Rule 2.33(2)(o) of the Insolvency Rules (1986) requires 
the proposal to explain how the company will continue to be financed if the plan is 
approved (Loubser 2010: 208). In most rescues, additional financing is required in 
order to execute a turnaround strategy, and this is therefore considered a prudent 
condition. While an administrator has the authority to borrow and encumber assets, 
no incentive or protection is given to post-commencement lenders (Plainer & Ball 
2003: 14). The UK plan is expected to attract investment while ensuring the best 
return for creditors. Both of these depend on the feasibility declaration of the plan, 
which is mandatory and should be communicated with the interests of potential 
investors in mind and win the vote of creditors.
The proposal for a CVA or scheme of arrangement offers a binding contract on all 
affected parties. In the case of a CVA, secured and preferential creditors cannot be 
bound without their consent. However, in a scheme of arrangement, all parties can 
be contractually bound. In either case, the proposal, if approved, becomes a legally 
binding contract. Like the US plan, the proposal is expected to take the form and 
nature of a legal document in ensuring that the rights and interests of all parties are 
protected.
The suggestion of further transparency from Cork’s Report is evident in the 
UK Enterprise Act (2002). Creditors are expected to be provided with sufficient 
information to allow them to participate in the proceedings in a meaningful way. 
To ensure this, paragraph 49 of Schedule B1 and Rule 2.33 of the Insolvency Rules 
(1986) detail specifics to be present in the plan. Amendments to the insolvency rules, 
which took effect in April 2010, have further improved transparency throughout 
the proceedings. More emphasis is placed on transparency when dealing with pre-
packaged plans. The Statement of Insolvency Practice 16 (SIP 16) of 2009 introduced 
a list of requirements that pre-packaged plans should adhere to (Conway 2012: 3). 
Much of this statement focuses on ensuring transparency.
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Australia
1Australia’s Corporations Act (Australian Government 2005), through a process known 
as ‘voluntary administration’ (VA), provides for temporary protection from creditors, 
and delegates corporate governance responsibilities to an external administrator 
over the company’s ailing affairs (Routledge 2007: 8). In line with modern rescue 
legislation, the objective of the proceeding, as stated in Part 5.3A, section 435A of the 
Act, is to allow the
• business, property and affairs of an insolvent company to be administered in such a way that:
•  it maximises the chances of the company, or as much as possible of its business, continuing 
in existence; or
•  it is not possible for the company or its business to continue in existence – results in a bet-
ter return for the company’s creditors and members than would result from an immediate 
winding up of the company. 
1To ensure this, Australian legislation offers a flexible and relatively inexpensive 
procedure to the company, allowing it some breathing space so that it can attempt 
a compromise or arrangement with its creditors (Sellars 2001: 2). The procedure 
commences as soon as the debtor appoints an administrator. The primary objective 
of the administration is then to obtain the creditors’ acceptance of the proposed Deed 
of Company Arrangement (AUS Plan) and thereafter its implementation (Kloppers 
1999: 421). Once appointed, a 28-day moratorium is immediately in effect, with a 
possible 35-day extension conditional on court approval. In the event that creditors 
accept the deed, the company has 21 days from the meeting of creditors to decide 
whether it will accept and execute the plan. However, should the company fail to 
do so, this will lead to the commencement of liquidation (Australian Government 
2005). At the point where the deed of company arrangement has been fully executed, 
the administration comes to an end and the company is thereafter regulated by such 
deed (Burdette 2004: 439).
VA was designed to be swift and efficient by eliminating almost any court 
involvement (Sellars 2001: 9). The process has in many cases gone from beginning to 
end without any consideration by the court whatsoever. However, the Act does afford 
the court specific powers, in particular when a party considers the scheme is being 
abused. While the court may be called on at any point in the proceedings, this is 
avoided as far as possible. Influence over the proceedings is more likely to derive from 
creditors and the administrator in charge. Despite its ‘creditor-friendly’ disposition, 
the number of companies entering the scheme that are rescued is increasing. The 
process shares more favourable characteristics with a ‘debtor-oriented’ regime (Sellars 
2001: 12).
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The deed of company arrangement is a plan comprising decisions that consider 
the present condition of the company and the ultimate goal of restoring the company 
to a sustainable going concern. Once approved, the plan acts as the ‘constitution of 
the company’ (Kloppers 1999: 422). The administrator then executes the turnaround 
in accordance with the deed. Such a plan would demand detailed workings of the 
administrator’s intentions, setting out the process that will unfold. In addition to 
this, it also affords substantially affected parties the ability to influence the feasibility 
of the plan. The Act gives the administrator a great deal of flexibility in the types 
of proposal allowed in a deed of company arrangement. However, the degree of 
information provided is limited to the minimum needed for a creditor to make an 
informed assessment of the plan (Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
2008: 6).
In the light of the limited court involvement, the deed is primarily targeted at 
the interests of creditors in order to attain a favourable vote. The Act does require 
the deed to contain specific information, ensuring the content is sufficient for 
decision-making purposes. These can be found under Section 444A, Part 5.3A of 
the Corporations Act (2005). The deed is responsible for providing the terms and 
conditions, warranties and indemnities, the extent or nature of obligations, and 
relationships between those persons who are a party to it. In addition, the minutes 
of all meetings must be recorded and lodged. Details regarding the ‘committee of 
inspection’ are also expected to be disclosed. ‘Prescribed provisions’ are deemed to be 
automatically included in the plan unless otherwise discussed (Australian Securities 
& Investments Commission 2008: 9). In so doing, it aims to communicate to all the 
affected parties a sufficient degree of information.
Chapter 5.3A 444D and 444G clearly explain the effect of the deed on creditors 
and other affected parties. The deed of company administration, once approved, is 
binding on all unsecured creditors and only the secured creditors that have agreed to 
be bound. In the event that a secured creditor has not agreed to be bound by the plan, 
and that creditor’s discord threatens the viability of the process, the court is granted 
power to keep such creditor from exercising its security. The content and nature of 
the deed is therefore cognisant of such contractual powers and is bound to enforce 
them in any event. The Act requires that a provision in terms of termination of the 
deed be included.
The Corporations Act makes clear provision for a transparent plan. Much of the 
onus in this regard is placed on the administrator to ensure that the plan is in the 
interests of creditors (Part 5.3 Section 438). To clear the administrators of suspicion 
of any ulterior motives, they are obliged to declare all indemnities and relevant 
relationships (436DA Declarations by Administrator) and expected to update their 
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declaration should it be deemed out of date at any time. The disclosure of information 
in order for creditors to understand the proposal and appreciate its legal and practical 
implications is enhanced by a report set out in Section 439A for the release of such 
information.
The Australian Act offers little encouragement to ensure that the deed 
makes provision for distressed investors, nor does it offer any incentives for post-
commencement financing. The Act does, however, allow extensive flexibility when 
working with a deed of company arrangement. The rationale is that this enables 
the plan to meet the particular circumstances of the company and its creditors in 
a way that could attract investment. In addition, the management liabilities of the 
insolvent company are enhanced by the deed, a feature most useful when securing 
post-commencement funding. Recent reforms have encouraged investment, allowing 
equity to be raised far more easily than before (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2009: 14). 
Administrators are now granted specific powers to transfer shares without the court’s 
or shareholders’ approval, and exempted from the detailed and costly disclosure 
obligations that accompanied issuing new equity before. The plan, however, remains 
the most persuasive means of attracting any possible investment.
Canada
1Canada offers distressed companies two formal procedures for restructuring an 
insolvent business. The first, and less popular of the two, is legislated by the Bankruptcy 
and Insolvency Act (Canadian Government 1985a) (BIA), which requires a proposal 
to be submitted to the court. Alternatively, rehabilitation can come in the form of the 
Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (Canadian Government 1985b) (CCAA). 
This Act, which is a federal law, allows the company to restructure its financial affairs 
through a formal ‘Plan of Arrangement’ (CA Plan). Both statutes are largely similar 
and differ only in minor technicalities (Grundy 2006: 83). The CCAA is restricted 
to larger corporations, with a prerequisite of having over CDN$5 million owing to 
creditors in order to file (International Insolvency Institute 2003: 1). Notably, banks, 
insurance, trust and loan, railway and telegraph companies are all excluded by the 
Act. In line with international legislature, the primary object is to assist financially 
distressed companies to avoid bankruptcy while maximising returns for their 
creditors, preserving both jobs and the company’s value as a going concern.
The process is initiated by an application to the court by the debtor. The court 
typically grants protection after it has reviewed the company’s projected cash flow 
and financial statements. Should the court deem fit, it will issue an order giving the 
company 30 days of protection, otherwise known as a ‘Stay’, from its creditors (FMC 
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Law 2010: 127).The court is permitted to prolong the Stay in order to facilitate the 
preparation of the plan. The company is expected to continue operating during the 
Stay period, and may commence restructuring activities at any time. The Stay order 
is obligated to be accompanied by an appointed ‘monitor’, who oversees the work 
of the debtor to ensure that the court’s instructions are complied with, and relays 
feedback to the court should any activity hinder the viability of the debtor.
Influencers over the process are quite similar to those in the US’s Chapter 11, 
although there is no ability to ‘cram down’ the classes of creditors (Besant 2013: 
5). The process favours debtor-friendly principles, which are expected to have an 
impact on the plan. CCAA proceedings are carried out under the supervision of the 
court, which has the final say in approving the Plan of Arrangement. The CCAA 
legislation allows a company to address its shareholders, in addition to its creditors, 
if it so chooses. However, the shareholder’s vote is most likely to be revoked if they 
consider they will be affected by the plan. For the plan to be successful, creditors per 
class would need a majority in favour of the plan. The strongest artificial influence 
over the plan is expected to come from the court.
The CCAA is vague with regard to the expectations of the plan, with little statutory 
guidance provided by the Act. Legislation allows for a great deal of flexibility in 
designing the plan, which is ultimately limited by the integrity of the drafters and 
by what the creditors are willing to support (Grundy 2006: 115). The contents of the 
plan are therefore guided by experience gained over the past two decades and the 
related jurisprudence. This has resulted in a reasonably predictable and consistent 
approach to the publication of plans (Fitch 2003: 1). A proposal under BIA, however, 
has a number of mandatory conditions it must fulfil, which are set out as priorities 
under the Act. The bulk of the plan remains constrained by the same rules as a Plan 
of Arrangement (Grundy 2006: 116).
The plan filed under the CCAA normally includes an information circular 
detailing the arrangement and its effect on all classes of creditors and shareholders 
(if an arrangement with shareholders is being proposed) or any other affected party 
(Grace 2011: 2). The focal point is usually how creditors are being compromised 
by the plan. At the procedural hearing, the court reviews the plan to ensure that 
all the affected parties have been clearly informed about the process that has taken 
place and the proposed strategy going forward. Sections 6(5), 6(3) and 6(6) of the Act 
(1985a) make special provision to ensure that the plan accommodates employees, as 
regards the treatment of pension schemes in particular. Moreover, the plan’s decorum 
expects a clear detail of definitions, meetings forgone and an outlay of procedural 
matters to be expected. In all, the document is expected to relay all the relevant 
information to the affected parties. An interesting concept that has emerged is that of 
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Substantive Consolidation of the plan, the primary objective of which is to facilitate 
easier communication of the plan to creditors (Fitch 2003: 3).
Like Chapter 11, the CCAA prescribes the holding of a ‘disclosure hearing’ in the 
form of a ‘fairness inquiry’, the objective of which is to ensure that the plan is fair, 
reasonable and equitable (Sarra 2007: 244). A criterion in determining whether the 
plan is compliant is set out by the judicial authority as follows (Grundy 2006: 121):
1. The composition of the unsecured vote
2. The recovery creditors would receive in liquidation or bankruptcy
3. Alternatives to the plan
4. Whether there has been oppression of rights of certain creditors
5. Whether there is unfairness to shareholders
6. Public interest, including the interests of the debtor’s employees.
1An additional feature to ensure transparency of the plan requires the court-appointed 
monitor/trustee to supervise the proceedings and the development of the plan on 
behalf of the affected stakeholders (Section 11.7). This role entails monitoring the 
operations of the debtor in assisting with the process, and sometimes includes the 
drafting of the plan itself. The required information circular, in addition to the 
trustees’ report, which must be approved by the monitor, is intended to ensure fairness 
and transparency of the plan and proceedings.
Under section 6 of the CCAA, the creditors are permitted to alter the plan at the 
meeting of creditors. An amended plan may be reconsidered by the debtors, but if it 
remains unchanged it will be voted on and then passed to the court for ‘sanctioning’. 
A sanctioned plan is binding on all creditors whose claims are compromised by the 
plan. This is clearly stated under Division II 66.28(2) of the BIA for a proposal, and 
under Part 1 6(1) of the CCAA. The plan is then expected to take effect once certain 
closing conditions have been completed (Grundy 2006: 123).
The CCAA offers a number of options for interim financing under section 
11.2(1). A favourite of these is similar to DIP financing under the US Chapter 11, 
the provision of which is intended to be to the benefit of all the interested parties, as 
it enables the debtor to maintain the going-concern value of the business. The DIP 
prides itself on a super-priority charge that favours the lender above all other creditors. 
The rationale is to address the inability of a financially distressed company to either 
acquire trade credit from existing suppliers or to raise additional funds to finance the 
daily operations after the company has filed. DIP financing is known to usually pass 
unchallenged in court, since it involves such deliberated negotiations to reach a point 
of consensus. The court is obliged, however, to ensure that such investments pass a 
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‘balance of prejudices’ test. In addition, the plan is expected to outline any financial 
agreement proposed or already accepted by the court.
All four regimes acknowledge and support the notion that the business is of higher 
value as a going concern than it would be if it were liquidated. While the objectives 
may vary in accordance with a creditor-friendly or debtor-friendly disposition, and 
with the presence and degree of influencers, what is clear is that the plan remains 
a stand-alone document that fulfils a mainstream role in the formal turnaround 
process. Expectations within the regimes showed consistency with the objectives set 
by the overseeing legislature and so could be clearly identified in this study.
Research objectives and questions
1This study posed the following investigative questions:
• ‘What are the functions and aims of the rescue plan?’
• ‘Are there broad principles to direct the compilation of a rescue plan (based on 
international regimes)?’ and finally,
• ‘Are the guidelines in the South African Companies Act (2008) aligned with 
these principles?’
Research design and approach
1The study set out to use the questions mentioned under research objectives and 
questions simultaneously to guide the research. Table 1 indicates the research design 
components used to direct the research flow and focus based on Yin’s (2003: 21) 
design.
Key scientifi c beliefs of the researchers
1To answer these questions, the researchers were aware of their own methodological 
values, beliefs and particular philosophical assumptions. These assumptions could 
influence the way in which the research was conducted and are stated in the 
introduction and throughout the paper in order to explain the intellectual climate in 
which the research was undertaken.
Grounded theory approach
1A grounded theory approach was used as the research strategy (Saunders, Lewis & 
Thornhill 2009: 148). As data were collected, so the formation of an initial theoretical 
framework emerged. Multiple sources were reviewed to draw sound observations 
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leading to the identification of themes (leads) that were further supported by 
continued exploration of the literature.




mmdcccxiiiWhat guidelines gleaned from international regimes could direct business rescue 
plans in South Africa?
mmdcccxivContext mmdcccxvTurnaround and business rescue
mmdcccxviPropositions mmdcccxvii1. The functions and expectations of the rescue plan are clear.
mmdcccxviii2.  There are certain principles to be followed in the compilation of a rescue plan 
(based on international regimes).




mmdcccxxiThe functions and aims (expectations) of the rescue plan
mmdcccxxiiThe principles involved
mmdcccxxiiiUnits of analysis mmdcccxxivLiterature
mmdcccxxvInternational turnaround regimes
mmdcccxxviChapter 6 of the Act 
mmdcccxxviiLogic linking 
the data to the 
propositions
mmdcccxxviiiGeneric guidelines, principles and elements should be available in the 




mmdcccxxxPrinciples identifi ed from regimes
Source: Adapted from Yin (2003: 21)
Ontological positions
1Ontological positions comprise researchers’ views on the nature and essence of the 
research reality. Both researchers are objective realists who believe that knowledge 
comes from facts associated with real-life cases and their context. When either 
researcher found repeated mentions of practices and praxis, they could generalise 
them. The researchers aimed to maintain a critical view of each regime and interpret 
legal works from an international insolvency perspective. Their interest focused on 
understanding and describing a set of principles that could provide an international 
perspective on the expectations of a rescue plan for South Africa.
Epistemological positions
1In attempting to answer the research questions, the researchers were aware of their 
own individual methodological values, beliefs and philosophical assumptions. These 
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assumptions could influence how the research was conducted and are stated in 
order to understand the ‘intellectual climate’ in which it took place. The theory of 
knowledge (epistemology) of a researcher describes how one can discover underlying 
principles about social phenomena and how one can demonstrate knowledge. The 
researchers’ personal experiences with business failure and involvement in rescues 
ignited their interest in business rescue. At the same time, as an academic and 
turnaround consultant and as a postgraduate student, they have a preference for 
factual directives. Therefore the approach was based on a grounded theory approach 
(Corbin & Strauss 1990).
Research method
Research setting and background
1Rescue and turnaround regimes from four leading countries were obtained and 
scrutinised. As the philosophies underlying the regimes and their expectations of 
the rescue plan became clear, principles were identified and expanded in search of 
guidance for the compilation of plans. The interpretations were based on the shared 
objectives of the plans observed between regimes (see Table 1), which in turn gave 
direction to the identification of the principles that governed the structure of the 
plan.
Findings
1The research data gathered revealed that all four regimes regarded the rehabilitation 
of the company as their primary objective, while maximising the return for creditors. 
The aim of the reorganisation plan was, by all accounts, to meet the legislative 
objectives in such a manner that the relevant parties could determine whether or not 
to accept the plan.
The nature of the business rescue plan requires it to accommodate a wide number 
of circumstances and conditions. As expected, the legislature therefore refrained 
from detailing a prescribed format to which plans should adhere, but rather relied 
on expectations that had emerged through jurisprudence or legislative amendments. 
The expectations of all the regimes were seen to be similar in nature, although they 
were evidently aimed at serving the interests of parties responsible for the plan’s final 
approval. Despite artificial influence over the development of the plan, the contents 
remained subject to five core principles. Expectations identified in all four regimes 
indicate the existence of these principles in the plan throughout all four regimes. The 
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following principles emerged as the primary guidelines in the development of the 
reorganisation plan:
• The business rescue plan serves as a tool for feasibility declaration.
• The business rescue plan serves as a medium of communication.
• The business rescue plan serves as an enabler of transparency.
• The business rescue plan serves contractual obligations.
• The business rescue plan serves to attract and secure post-commencement funding 
(PCF).
1Table 2 provides a breakdown of the supporting expectations in each regime for the 
five principles identified.
Table 2: Supporting expectations for determining the principles






















mmdcccxlviiiCourt mmdcccxlixCreditors/Court mmdccclCreditors mmdcccliCourt mmdcccliiCreditors
mmdcccliiiBusiness rescue plan serves as a tool for feasibility declaration
mmdccclivThe plan must 
prove feasibility 
(11 USC § 
1129 )
mmdccclvTurnaround Strategy 













(Insolvency Act 1986, 
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mmdccclxxiiiDetails of the plan 
(Paragraph 49 of 
Schedule B1 and Rule 









mmdccclxxvii‘Best Interests of 
Creditors’ Test
mmdccclxxviiiProcedural values – 
Cork Report




good faith (11 











mmdccclxxxviiBusiness rescue plan serves contractual obligations
mmdccclxxxviii11 USC § 
1141 – Effect of 
confi rmation
mmdccclxxxixBinding on all parties 
(Insolvency Rules, SI 
1986/1925 Rule 1.19)
mmdcccxcBinding on all 
parties of the plan 
(Chapter 5.3A 
444D and 444G)
mmdcccxciBinding on all parties 
of the plan (Division II 





mmdcccxciiiBusiness rescue plan serves to attract and secure post-commencement funding (PCF) 
mmdcccxciv11 USC § 364 – 
Obtaining credit
mmdcccxcvExplanation of future 
funding (Rule 2.33 
(2) (o))






Insolvency Practice 16 
(SIP 16)
mmcmDIP fi nancing
Principles for the development of the reorganisation plan
1The five principles for the development of the reorganisation plan are discussed in 
the following subsections.
Business rescue plan serves as a tool for feasibility declaration
1The outcome of the plan is reliant on what is feasible; that is, based on the facts, 
circumstances and practical assumptions, the plan involves a strategy intended 
to rehabilitate the company and in so doing offer creditors a better return. In a 
liquidation claim, however, a creditor’s return is at far less risk of varying than in 
rehabilitation, where the risk exists that the plan might fail. As a result, the proposed 
route to recovery is pertinent to creditors evaluating the risk of the proposed return. 
mmmdclxxviiiTable 2 continued
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Some insolvency laws also give the court the authority to reject a plan on the grounds 
that it is not feasible (Bracewell & Giuliani 2012: 27). A clear expectation of all the 
regimes is that the plan should lay out a route to recovery in order for the relevant 
parties to adequately scrutinise it and determine the extent of its feasibility.
The rescue plan has the potential to serve as a powerful strategic management 
tool (Hall 1980: 75; Holtzhauzen 2010: 113). It provides a clear reference point 
during the rapid and often confusing changes common during the rescue process. 
It also safeguards key resources by clearly acknowledging and preserving those on 
which the strategy for recovery is based (Balgobin & Pandit 2001: 14). This principle 
requires the plan to explain how the business will remain operational and successfully 
reorganised, how implementation of the plan will be supervised, and the timeframe 
for its implementation.
As a strategic tool, the rescue plan assists practitioners to plan and coordinate 
the reorganisation process (Flamholtz, Nayer & Lal 2005: 54). Grant (2003: 491) 
explains that with the increased volatility of the business environment associated 
with most turnaround situations, systematic strategic planning is more difficult, yet 
it is still crucial to plan strategically. In some cases, a process of ‘planned emergence’ 
strategies is evident (Grant 2003: 515).
Business rescue plan serves as a medium of communication
1Balgobin and Pandit (2001: 314) maintain that a rescue plan that is communicated 
properly will help clarify and safeguard critical resources. Kow (2004: 242) endorses 
this by concluding that a communications plan must form part of the turnaround 
strategy. He further reiterates that the plan should identify and make clear why the 
company is undergoing the turnaround effort, how it will do so, what the employees 
can expect during the process, and what the company will gain from the effort.
According to Section 150(2) of the South African Companies Act: ‘The business 
rescue plan must contain all the information reasonably required to facilitate 
affected persons in deciding whether or not to accept or reject the plan.’ Effective 
communication is thus implied as a means of adequately informing creditors. 
Furthermore, the plan must persuade key stakeholders to believe in the future 
potential of the business by building credibility, confidence and trust in the future 
prospects of the business.
The business rescue process usually leaves the practitioner with little time for 
discussion with all the affected parties. Until the plan is published, the majority of 
the stakeholders may be oblivious to the turnaround strategies or the reasons for 
distress. Though this is not advisable, it is often the case. The business rescue plan 
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therefore plays a key communication role in the turnaround process; it needs to be 
clear, understandable and holistic with regard to the reorganisation of the company 
going forward. Practitioners should be aware of rumours and misconceptions that 
creditors may have, and address these shortfalls in the plan. Moreover, the plan is 
bound to be heavily laden with legal jargon. Authors of the plan ought to be aware 
that the relevant parties may lack the legal knowledge to interpret many parts of 
the plan. Though in many of the regimes the onus is not on the practitioner to 
accommodate such persons, this does in all likelihood hinder the primary objective 
of the plan.
Business rescue plan serves as an enabler of transparency
1The governing legislature requires that the plan be transparent and predictable. The 
rationale is to enable potential lenders and creditors to understand how proceedings 
function and to assess the risk accompanying their position as a creditor in the event 
of rehabilitation. Success in this regard will promote stability in commercial relations 
and nurture lending and investment at lower-risk premiums. Transparency and 
predictability will in addition allow creditors to clarify priorities, prevent arguments 
by offering a backdrop against which relative rights and risks can be assessed, 
and help define the limits of any discretion (United Nations 2012: 13). Vague and 
loosely designed plans have the potential to undermine not only the confidence of 
all participants, but also their willingness to make investment decisions. As far as 
possible, the plan should clearly indicate all provisions that may affect the rights of 
creditors or alter their risk profile.
The disclosure hearing or fairness enquiry, in the US and Canada respectively, 
showcases prime examples of how legislatures have extended themselves in addressing 
the prevalence of transparency. In some cases the use of a third party, such as a 
trustee, is deemed fit to oversee the preparation of the plan from within the company 
so that critical information is not omitted. Such provisions are merely ‘fail-safes’ 
throughout the process; the ultimate assurance of transparency should stem from the 
possessed liability of the author. If a plan is discovered to have concealed information 
or presented misleading information, the courts or administrative agencies should be 
afforded the appropriate penalties.
A report compiled by the World Bank (2005: 7) stresses the importance of 
transparency, especially in emerging markets, through on-going monitoring, 
whether before or during a restructuring, or after a reorganisation plan has been 
implemented. The disclosure of basic information comprising financial statements, 
operating statistics and detailed cash flow projections is needed for sound risk 
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assessment. A characteristic of firms in financial distress is weak corporate governance 
(Elloumi & Gueyié 2001: 16). As the newer insolvency legislation supports a more 
debtor-friendly environment and information is a factor of time, disclosure of what 
is known and what is not known is vital to maintaining a transparent process. The 
practitioner functioning under the influence of ‘agency theory’ could contribute 
further complications.
Business rescue plan serves contractual obligations
1All the regimes ensure that if a plan is approved by the required parties, it becomes 
a binding contract thereafter. The ramifications thereof are integral to the 
reorganisation process and enable the recovery of the business by ensuring critical 
support for the turnaround. The plan is expected to disclose the nature and extent of 
any binding obligations it requires from the parties involved.
In certain regimes, including that of the US, the courts play an active role in 
binding creditors and rendering the plan enforceable on parties that might not 
necessarily have approved the plan. Such a case is indicative of formal rehabilitation, 
as the court resembles an artificial influencer in order to increase the chances of 
success of the reorganisation (United Nations 2005: 218).
Where a plan is approved by creditors without ratification by the court, the 
legislation grants parties, including the debtor, the right to challenge the approval 
of the plan. Some insolvency laws also offer a ‘cram-down’ provision that enables 
one or more classes to make the plan binding on other classes. Such a mechanism 
would, however, require court intervention to succeed. The result is that the plan 
must be fair and in the best interests of the majority of stakeholders in order to be 
truly binding.
In South Africa, the business rescue plan, once it has been adopted by creditors 
and the shareholders of the company, becomes a document binding on all the affected 
parties. This includes any persons present or not present at the meeting, irrespective 
of the nature of their vote or the fact that they have proven a claim (Section 152(4) 
2008).
The company, under the supervision of the practitioner, must take all the necessary 
measures to fulfil the conditions to which the execution of the plan may be subject, 
and to implement the plan itself. The practitioner is also bound by the terms of the 
plan and, by virtue of his or her position of power, is inevitably responsible for the 
implementation of the plan. The parties are contractually bound until the business 
rescue plan has been substantially implemented, whereupon the business rescue 
practitioner must file a notice to that effect (Section 152(8) 2009).
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Obviously the business rescue plan must contain sufficient guidelines, as well as 
provide adequate information to all the affected parties, in order to be considered. 
The contractual obligation of the plan makes it difficult for the practitioner to recuse 
himself subsequent to its approval. Furthermore, the practitioner can be held liable for 
omitting critical information from the plan that was known at the time of publication 
(Museta 2011: 53). This requires that the plan encompass all relevant information, 
not only for decision-making purposes but to prevent legal action against the process 
and the practitioner.
Business rescue plan serves to attract and secure PCF
1To ensure the continued operation of the distressed entity after the commencement 
of formal proceedings, it is critical to obtain a source of new finance as soon as 
possible. To sustain the business as a going concern, business activities such as goods 
and services from suppliers, labour costs, insurance, rent, maintenance of contracts 
and other operating expenses, along with the costs of maintaining the value of assets, 
require access to funds of some sort. The premise of post-commencement funding 
extends from short-term recovery needs to the long-term strategy of the reorganisation 
plan (United Nations 2005: 113).
The reorganisation plan is expected to address any sort of PCF that has been 
required, approved or recommended. The plan should set out the effects of funding 
on the business and on the interests of any affected party. The pros and cons of any 
financial arrangement should be clearly addressed for objective decision-making. 
Incentivised tools within insolvency legislatures are aimed at encouraging PCF 
(Du Preez 2012: 36). This may afford the ability to authorise super-priority status 
to credit or debt incurred. Such actions inevitably have far-reaching consequences. 
Where the plan is concerned, the reasoning and use of such tools offered by formal 
reorganisation need to be explicitly exposed.
In many cases the plan undertakes the burden of attracting the bulk of PCF. 
Accommodating investment within the plan is a strategic, and in most cases critical, 
move. Where funding is conditional on the plan’s approval, or vice versa, the plan 
should afford the mechanisms to do so effectively. In some cases the plan may prohibit 
new borrowing unless the need for it is identified in the plan.
The contractual nature of the plan cannot be overlooked by investors either. 
Where the plan ratifies any sort of PCF, it affords no exception to the lender unless 
obviously stated. Securing and binding lenders to the plan enables the mitigation of 
risk, which is used when approving the plan (United Nations 2005: 115).
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Comparing the principles of the plan with Chapter 6
1Sections 150–154 of the Companies Act, No. 71 of 2008, deal with the development 
and approval of the business rescue plan. The Act prescribes in Section 150(2)a–c 
a set of mandatory elements to be included in the plan. Table 3 lists these elements 
and correlates them with the most relevant principle. These elements do not 
constitute sufficient information for the decision-making, but are rather a baseline 
of information expected to be included in any meaningful plan. The majority of 
these elements are associated with the principle of feasibility declaration. Other 
requirements, such as the remuneration agreement and practitioner’s certificate, are 
transparency mechanisms. Communication is implied but not explicitly detailed, 
while no mention is made of PCF or expectations thereof with regard to the plan. 
In cases where elements fall short of each principle, it is assumed that the following 
clause within the Act can be called on:
The business rescue plan must contain all the information reasonably required to facilitate af-
fected persons in deciding whether or not to accept or reject the plan (Republic of South Africa 
2008).
1What can be deduced immediately is that Chapter 6 falls significantly short of 
addressing the five principles associated with the plan. For example, no reference 
is made to presenting a turnaround strategy, nor is there a requirement that a cash-
flow projection should accompany the plan. The elements listed in Table 3 are not 
well defined, so that it is difficult to assume their relevance to each principle. While 
the aims of business rescue are certainly in line with those of other modern rescue 
regimes, the chapter fails to address these principles with detail and clarity. The Act, 
in addition, makes no use of any mechanisms or tests to ensure transparency, fairness 
or feasibility.
It may not be necessary to amend the legislation to address these issues, as 
regulators have been used for this purpose by some regimes. Case law has also been 
responsible for many of the established expectations; in the US and Canada, where 
this is most common, specialised bankruptcy courts have been set up.
Implications for industry
1This study aimed to assist practitioners and parties affected by the business rescue 
plan by developing from the expectations of international regimes a set of principles 
that would assist in the structure and content of the plan. Business rescue in South 
Africa is currently highly under-skilled and backed by little experience in formal 
rehabilitation mechanisms. Though Chapter 6 is modelled on a modern rescue 
system, it still requires local uptake of knowledge, experience and culture to become
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mmcmvii(i) mmcmviiiList of all the material assets mmcmix•
mmcmx(ii) mmcmxiList of creditors mmcmxii•
mmcmxiii(iii) mmcmxivProbable dividend to creditors in the event of liquidation mmcmxv• mmcmxvi•
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1effectively established. The literature gathered in this paper was used to extrapolate 
a set of principles to assist in the formulation of better plans. Furthermore, the study 
aimed to guide the local expectations of a business rescue plan.
The regulator may benefit from this research, as it gives guidelines that could be 
useful in future licensing of rescue practitioners, as well as training requirements.
Limitations of the study and suggested future research
1The most significant limitation of the study was the limited pool of local academic 
literature on business rescue, as well as on the rehabilitation plan. Little or no research 
has been published on the expectations, nature or structure of the plan. Reference 
to the plan is frequently made, but it is rarely discussed in depth. In addition, the 
researchers found limited rich knowledge and access to case law in each of the 
regimes examined. As is characteristic of formal rehabilitation, case law constitutes 
a fair amount of insight into rehabilitation protocol and expectations. Although it 
was not the intention of this research to provide a legal view on the topic, this would 
nevertheless have added to the study.
Since the business rescue scene is still a relatively young one, research in this field 
is needed and fairly open. Future research with regard to the topic of this paper should 
consider adding to information on local expectations and assist in evaluating existing 
plans with a measurement tool. Future research could also expand the scope of study 
by comparing business rescue with international regimes in various spheres. This 
would dramatically help academics as well as industry to adopt better mechanisms to 
operate effectively and increase the scope of knowledge in understanding the impact 
of the plan. Finally, there is a need to evaluate business rescue plans based on the 
principles and guidelines in Chapter 6.
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